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ABSTRACT:  
This study investigates how visual manipulation is employed on the Facebook page of a far-right 
party; and whether manipulation evokes different forms of engagement from Facebook users. 
The study takes as a case the Facebook page of the British National Party (BNP), which has recently 
been censored from the social media platform. It therefore provides a rare insight in the visual 
practices of the party’s online political communication. A manual coding of 342 images into fac-
tual, funny, fallacious or fabricated content finds that completely fabricated information in images 
is rare. However, most images do contain information that is presented in a fallacious or mislead-
ing manner. The results show how deliberate manipulated images evoke more engagement in the 
form of comments and more negative emotional responses than images that present information 
in a factual or funny manner.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Visual forms of political manipulation are an age-old phenomenon, but much has 
changed since printed posters and leaflets. Whereas before, political propaganda was 
difficult to manipulate and hard to circulate, nowadays it is easier for almost anyone to 
produce fake political imagery in a convincing manner and rapidly disseminate them. 
Photoshop allows for falsifications that are sometimes impossible to distinguish from 
reality. Images that are plausibly manipulated can often spread widely before any cor-
rections are made (Highfield and Leaver 2016, 52).  
Images as these are often referred to as memes (Shifman 2014; Mina 2019). Evolu-
tionary biologist Richard Dawkins (2006, 3) coined the term ‘meme’ as a cultural variant 
of the gene. He described memes as "non-genetic behaviour and cultural ideas, which 
are transferred from person to person". When the reach of a meme is large, one can 
speak of a viral effect, as the content has spread like a virus online (Shifman 2014, 11). 
Internet memes play an increasingly important role in the dissemination of political in-
formation to citizens and voters (Penney 2017).  
Despite the suggestion that images are suitable for spreading manipulated forms of 
information (Marwick and Lewis 2017), there is a dearth of studies that examine how 
information is communicated in these online visuals and what their impact is. Studies 
focusing on phenomena such as fake news, misinformation and disinformation rely al-
most solely on textual content and have a strong focus on foreign, often Russian, disin-
formation by bots and trolls (Bennett and Livingston 2018; Narayanan et al. 2018). Ma-
nipulated content spread by established political actors, such as parties and politicians, 
has been neglected in research. Nevertheless, the prominent, and often legitimate role 
of these actors can make their discursive practices particularly salient for influencing 
peoples’ political views and setting the agenda. Moreover, as a recent study of Pew Re-
search Center has found, most American internet users perceive political parties and 
politicians as the main source of fake news, instead of journalists, foreign actors or the 
public (Mitchell, Gottfried, Stocking, Walker, and Fedeli 2019).  
Information manipulation does not limit itself to the right side of the political spec-
trum (Waterson 2017a). Nevertheless, far-right actors are considered one of the primary 
creators and distributors of manipulated information online (Bennett and Livingston 
2018; Faris et al. 2017; Humprecht 2018; Marwick and Lewis 2017; Narayanan et al. 
2018; Sunstein 2018). These groups are characterized by their populist, nativist and au-
thoritarian ideology (Mudde 2007). Nativism refers to a combination of emphasizing 
one’s own culture, traditions and nationality, and negatively portraying culturally 
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deviant outgroups (Mudde 2007; Rydgren 2005). The populist nature of these groups is 
visible in their anti-elitist sentiment and opposition to the establishment (Mudde 2007). 
This study aims to fill the above-mentioned gaps by analysing how information is dis-
seminated in images by the far-right British National Party (BNP). The BNP was formed 
in 1982 by John Tydall, a former supporter of the fascist party National Front. It was most 
successful under leadership of Nick Griffin, who downplayed the party’s previous anti-
Semitic views and broadened its issue scope (Copsley and Macklin 2011: 85). The BNP is 
an example of a party that has been remarkably successful online. It was the first British 
party to create a webpage in 1995 (Copsey and Macklin 2011, 96). Despite it being a 
rather small party, it held “sophisticated e-campaigns” and adopted innovative strate-
gies, such as an online television channel (Small, Taris and Danchuk 2008, p. 138). The 
website was the most viewed of all political parties in Britain in 2007, and in Europe in 
2011 (Copsey and Macklin 2011, 96). Also on social media, the BNP attracted many more 
followers than offline. Due to its hateful posts, the party was censored from Facebook in 
April 2019 (Hern 2019). The BNP is a particularly interesting case for studying its online 
visual propaganda, as its strong visual culture has been subject of earlier studies (Lee 
and Littler 2015; Engström 2014).   
Beyond looking at how visual propaganda of the party is employed; the paper also 
addresses the effects of visual manipulation on user engagement. Engagement refers in 
this paper to how often users comment below a post, and how often they – through the 
click of a mouse –indicate their emotional reaction towards the image. Content that 
evokes much engagement of users or many strong emotional responses, such as anger, 
tends to be amplified by the algorithms of these platforms (Matamoros-Fernández 2017, 
939). Therefore, such content is likely to reach a broad audience online. 
The paper addresses the following questions how is visual propaganda employed on 
the Facebook page of the BNP? And how does this visual propaganda influence user en-
gagement? Memes and visuals are becoming a mainstream form of communication in 
this post-text world (Bowles 2018). Understanding how these visual pieces of culture are 
used for political communication and manipulation provides an insight in the way in 
which social media has been able to amplify the voice of the far-right. Studying symbols 
and references allows for understanding how the far-right has been able to enter the 
mainstream (Miller-Idriss 2018). Moreover, now that younger generations are shifting 
their attention to visual social media platforms (Perrin and Anderson 2019), a better un-
derstanding of manipulative memes and their effects is necessary.  
In the following sections, I will elaborate on the concepts of propaganda and media 
manipulation in images, and their possible effects on user engagement and emotions. 
Next, this study outlines the research design and methods after which the findings are 
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presented. The analysis shows that most content on the page of the BNP is presented in 
a fallacious or misleading way. This representation often evokes more anger and disbe-
lief compared to images representing content in factual or funny ways. The paper con-
cludes with a brief reflection on these results and the implications for understanding far-
right politics. 
 
 
2. Propaganda, media manipulation and emotions 
 
“In the widespread sense that we have entered a post-truth era” there has been a 
surge in research on phenomena such as fake news, misinformation, disinformation and 
malinformation (Benkler, Roberts and Faris 2018, 23). This study uses the umbrella con-
cept propaganda. Benkler, Roberts and Faris (2018, 26) define propaganda as “inten-
tional communication designed to manipulate a target population by affecting its beliefs, 
attitudes, or preferences in order to obtain behaviour compliant with political goals of 
the propagandist”. They indicate three critical elements of propaganda, namely “(a) an 
actor with the intent to manage a (b) target population’s attitudes or behaviours (c) 
through symbolic manipulation informed by a psychological model of belief or attitude 
formation and revision, as opposed to rational or deliberative approach” (Benkler et al. 
2018, 29). Research in the field of political mobilization and communication refer to 
frames as the tool that is employed by political actors to shape the public’s interpreta-
tion of political issues (Kriesi 2012a, 4). Frames are “central organizing ideas that provide 
coherence to a designated set of idea elements” (Kriesi 2012a, 4).  
Manipulation accounts for those forms of propaganda that might not necessarily be 
considered as normatively inappropriate (Benkler et al. 2018, 31). Benkler et al. (2018, 
31) for example argue that whilst outright false or materially misleading content (such 
as falsified videos or images) are clearly normatively inappropriate, using emotional lan-
guage is not necessarily deemed as such. For example, they compare the positive emo-
tions that were evoked by Martin Luther King Jr’s “I have a Dream” speech as considered 
desirable, compared to frames that evoke negative emotions about immigrants. This 
normative distinction fits with the typology created by Tandoc, Lim and Ling (2018), who 
categorize manipulations based on their levels of facticity and their levels of deception. 
Manipulations can be considered wrong when they contain information that is not fac-
tual. However, factual content can also be presented in a deceiving manner. This is the 
case for sensationalist-, junk- and partisan news (Faris et al. 2017; Narayanan et al. 2018; 
Humprecht 2018). These often use “emotionally driven language with emotive 
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expressions”, “misleading headlines” and “excessive capitalization” to deceive the 
viewer (Narayanan et al. 2018). 
Types of manipulation can differ in their persuasive power (Tandoc et al. 2018). For 
example, complete fabrications are not factual, whereas sensationalist or partisan news 
often contain aspects of truth. This makes that the latter has a stronger power to per-
suade than the former (Sunstein 2014). While Tandoc et al. (2018) rely on the level of 
deception to create their typology, there is a distinction between the aim or purpose to 
deceive, and the power to actually deceive. Whilst satire or parodies are not meant to 
deceive (Wardle and Derhakshan 2018), they can be deceiving. Tina Fey’s portrayal of 
Sarah Palin in Saturday Night Live, for example, made viewers more sceptical of Palin 
(Baumgartner, Morris and Walth 2012).   
Making a distinction between various forms of information representation is im-
portant, as people respond differently to true than to false stories. False content leads 
to much more engagement than factual content, as false content is considered more 
novel (Vosoughi, Roy and Aral 2018). A sentiment analysis of users’ textual responses to 
false and true tweets showed that false news led to more surprise and disgust, whereas 
facts provoked sadness, anticipation, joy and trust (Vosoughi et al. 2018, 1150). That 
content that evokes high arousal emotions is more likely to go viral was also shown by 
Berger and Milkman (2012). Larsson (2018) refers to this phenomenon, where people 
are more inclined to share online what upsets them than what makes them happy as the 
“indignation effect”. This is problematic, as Facebook and other social media platforms 
tend to reinforce content that is highly emotional and engaging their algorithmic design 
(Yardi and boyd 2010). Consequently, anger has become a useful tool for mobilization 
(Matamoros-Fernández 2018). 
Emotions are important for political mobilization, as they can alter political behaviour 
and matter in voting decisions (Kriesi 2012b). “Emotions help us gather and process in-
formation about the world, more rapidly than the conscious part of our brains could 
proceed” (Jasper 2018, 8). Brader (2005, 388) argues that “emotions play a fundamental 
role in reasoning and are as likely to enhance rationality as to subvert it”. He himself 
found that, by using music and images in their campaign ads to elicit emotions such as 
fear or enthusiasm, candidates could significantly alter the motivational and persuasive 
power of these adds. Similarly, adding emotional words or images to misleading political 
messages can make them more persuasive (Huddy and Gunnthorsdottir 2000).  
Different types of emotions have different political effects. Anger, for example, in-
creases political mobilization, more so than anxiety or enthusiasm (Valentino, Brader, 
Groenendyk, Gregorowicz, and Hutchings 2011). Anger arises “when threats are attribut-
able to a particular source”, giving the individual a certain feeling of control over the 
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situation, whereas with anxiety, the individual is less certain and thus less in control (Val-
entino et al. 2011, 159; Lerner and Keltner 2001; Smith and Kirby 2004; Tiedens and Lin-
ton 2001). Consequently, anger triggers risk-seeking behaviour, whereas anxiety leads 
to risk-avoidance (Lerner and Keltner 2001; Valentino et al. 2011). 
Fear and anger “have been used as the exemplars for most theories of emotions in 
politics, selected to exaggerate the suddenness and disruptive power of emotions” (Jas-
per 2018, 4). Besides these, what Jasper calls reflex emotions, which are “fairly quick, 
automatic responses to events and information”, far-right groups also often rely on what 
he (2018, 4) refers to as moral emotions, or the “feelings of approval or disapproval (…) 
based on moral intuitions or principles, such as shame, guilt, pride, indignation, outrage, 
and compassion”. 
Most research about fake news, misinformation, disinformation and malformation 
analysed textual rather than audio-visual misinformation (Tucker et al. 2018, 40). How-
ever, images can be more effective than text for political persuasion, as they contain 
certain manipulative techniques that make them more suitable for transferring a dis-
torted view of reality. 
 
 
3. Memes as modern-day propaganda 
 
In 2018, the New York Times wrote that we are entering a post-text future, which is 
characterized by a “decline of text and the exploding reach and power” of a “multimedia 
internet”, dominated by images, videos and audio (Manjoo 2018). Visuals, and in partic-
ular internet memes, have become a more and more dominant medium to transfer cul-
tural messages (Highfield and Leaver 2016).  
Memes can be considered a form of modern-day propaganda. They often present a 
simplistic message conveying “one uncomplicated idea or slogan” (Shifman 2014, 67). 
Through their briefness, facts can more easily be left out. There is limited space for shar-
ing detailed information or presenting counter arguments. Simplified messages can be 
especially persuasive if viewers have little or no knowledge on the topic that is being 
addressed (Baumgartner and Morris 2008). This simplicity means that images almost 
completely rely on visuals to convey a message. 
Visuals are effective for propagandizing political views for several reasons. Images are 
less threatening and are understandable to a larger audience than text (Entman 2004). 
Moreover, visual frames have a stronger influence on an audience (Schill 2012), as their 
influence is more subtle. A distorted view of reality can be created using manipulated 
images. Visual messages are especially memorable and leave a stronger memory mark 
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than text (Joffe 2008). Information spread via images can therefore be retrieved better 
at a later stage, than information transferred using text. Photographs are perceived as 
less falsifiable, causing less scepticism with the audience (Messaris and Abraham 2001, 
217).  
Images tend to evoke stronger emotions than texts (Joffe 2008, 85). They can be par-
ticularly effective for arousing strong emotions, such as fear and anger, which can influ-
ence political views (Gross 2008). Iyer and Oldmeadow (2006) for example show how 
people who saw imagery of a kidnapping felt significantly more fear than people who 
only read about it. 
As misleading content in visuals might be highly effective in influencing emotions and 
political mobilization, the remaining part of the paper will form a case study analysing 
how visual propaganda is employed by the British National Party (BNP), and how this 
influences emotions and user engagement.   
 
 
4. Design and methods 
 
The data from this study was gathered from the Facebook page of the BNP. During 
the time of this study, in August 2018, the party had 216.352 followers on Facebook, 
whereas during the local elections of May 2018, the last BNP councillor retired due to a 
lack of support (Pidd 2018). Analysing the content of such a popular page can thus give 
a good indication of what types of memes ‘work’ in terms of attracting support and gain-
ing resonance with online followers.  
For this study, the URLs of images that were posted on the page of the BNP were 
gathered using the image retriever from Netvizz (Rieder 2013). Additionally, text that 
accompanied the images were collected. Only the images that were visible on the page 
at the period of data gathering were included. Images or posts that Facebook or page 
owners have removed cannot be retrieved retrospectively. As hateful content is often 
censored from Facebook, the images were stored offline, as to be able to access them 
at a later stage. Therefore, URLs were put into the Chrome Extension Image Downloader 
as to download and save all images. For this study, the most recent 342 images were 
coded, covering a year between August 2017 and July 2018.  
Images come in different forms, such as photographs, fabricated visuals, memes, car-
toons, screenshots of Tweets, newspaper headlines or graphs. Almost all images ana-
lysed for this study (98%) had a corresponding caption adjoining the image. This study is 
not a complete image analysis, but rather a multimodal analysis (Serafini and Reid 2019). 
Multimodal forms of analysis are becoming increasingly used “in contemporary forms of 
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representation and communication”, particularly by “social science researchers working 
across online platforms and other forms of digital phenomena” (Serafini and Reid 2019, 
2). When it comes to the study of online visuals these additional captions are not often 
considered (Highfield and Leaver 2016; Pearce et al. 2018). Nevertheless, this additional 
caption is visible to viewers when they scroll through the Facebook timeline. It should 
therefore be included in the study as to understand the context of the visual (Serafini 
and Reid 2019).  
The first step in understanding how images were used for manipulation was to identify 
categories of information manipulation. Manipulated frames by Wardle and Derakhshan 
(2018) and Humprecht (2018) were taken as a starting point for analysing the framing of 
information in images. After an iterative process of going over a subset of the images to 
identify the different types of manipulative frames that were present in the images, a 
categorization was made consisting of factual, funny, fallacious and fabricated frames. 
These four categories differ in their level of facticity and their aim to deceive the viewer. 
Table 1 summarizes these four categories on these two axes.  
 
Table 1 – The level of facticity and the aim to deceive for different ways of information representation 
 High facticity Low facticity 
High (aim of) deception Fallacious Fabricated 
Low (aim of) deception Factual Funny 
Source: Authors elaboration 
 
After identifying the different categories, the images were analysed through a process 
of latent content analysis (Krippendorff 2004, 296; Neuendorf 2002, 23). Content analy-
sis is “a research technique for the objective, systematic and quantitative description of 
the manifest content of communication” (Berelson 1952, 18). Latent coding, in contrast 
to manifest coding, does not just count visible aspects in the image, but needs the inter-
pretation of the researcher to make a judgement. In this case, images were coded into 
the category to which they most clearly belonged. For each image, Google and Google 
image search were used as to identify the source of the image as well as to get more 
background and context on the text in and next to the image. If not much information 
was found, coders searched online using keywords that were posted in or next to the 
meme and searched for news articles posted around the time that the meme was 
posted.  
Images that stated information about the party, that summed up their policy pro-
posals or were pictures of the politicians without any further information were coded as 
factual. So were images dedicated to British heroes, British holidays and the British 
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nation. Images that were not factually wrong, but framed information “in a certain way 
by cropping photos or choosing quotes or statistics selectively” were coded as fallacious 
(Wardle and Derakhshan 2018, 49). These misleading types of images often apply a sen-
sationalist, partisan or exaggerated frame (Humprecht 2018). Images containing made 
up (news) stories or images that were debunked by fact checking outlets were coded as 
fabricated. Images that used satire to express political criticism were coded as funny. A 
few cases were coded in the category fuzzy, as not enough information could be found 
about the image to make a sound judgement. 
About 10 percent of the images was analysed and discussed by two coders. Agree-
ments were made on difficult cases. To illustrate these different forms of manipulation 
in the results section, a more qualitative analysis was carried out, consisting of making 
field notes on the topics, actors, colours and language used in the images.  
The second aspect of the study consisted of looking at how users interacted with these 
different forms of information representation. This study operationalizes user engage-
ment by looking at the number of comments by users, and their reactions through clicks. 
Users can post one or multiple comments (💬) below images and they can, with the click 
of a mouse, react to the image. Users can like (👍) a post, they can indicate whether the 
post made them laugh (😂), feel angry (😠), sad (😞), enthusiastic (❤️) or surprised 
(😲). They can only click on one of these options for each image. Users can share the 
image on their own page, so that their friends can see it. However, as this is private data 
that is related to a personal users’ timeline, information on shares are not retrieved by 
Netvizz. As the interactions are anonymized and cannot be traced back to individual us-
ers, the privacy of users is warranted. No other information on the user, such as name, 
gender or location, was gathered.  
To test the effects of online visual propaganda on users’ engagement, I carried out 
ANOVAs to compare the mean values of Facebook reactions for images that portrayed 
information in a funny, factual or fallacious manner. As the number of fabricated images 
was very low (N=4), these were not included in the statistical analysis, but were instead 
described in the text. 
 
 
5. Results 
 
Table 2 summarizes how information was represented in images on the Facebook 
page of the British National Party. In 37 percent of all images, information was depicted 
without a clear frame. Images that used humour to portray a topic or person were rela-
tively common, occurring in almost 9 percent of all instances. Most images – over 50 
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percent – used a form of manipulation, and thus relied on a fallacious frame. Four images 
(1 percent) contained completely fabricated content.  
 
Table 2 – Overview of the types of information used in visual images 
Type Number (%) 
Factual 127 37,13% 
Funny 30 8,77% 
Fallacious  179 52,34% 
Fabricated 4 1,17% 
Fuzzy 2 0,58% 
Total 342 100% 
Source: Authors elaboration 
 
Most images presented information without a clear frame. These factual messages 
often informed users about the policies of the BNP (Figure 1), or the specific activities 
that members of the party undertook. These images often use limited colours, either 
relying on white or yellow. Pictures of BNP politicians show them often in normal cloth-
ing, handing out flyers on the streets, and engaging with people. The images providing 
an overview of the BNP’s policies are clearly structured, they show a professional picture 
of the leader of the party, his name, and clearly indicate how to connect with the party 
on Facebook, Twitter and through the webpage. Many of these images contained the 
words “Share & Like” as to encourage users to bring this content under the attention of 
their broader networks. The logo of the party, a heart representing the British flag, is 
almost always present on these images. Other images coded as factual expressed sup-
port or pride towards the army, the English football team and the nation, and wished 
BNP supporters happy holidays. These visuals often showed the British flag as a back-
ground, contained poppy flowers and words such as pride and respect. These images fit 
well with the nationalist aspects of BNP’s ideology.  
Content can also be brought in a funny or humorous manner. Satire was rather com-
mon in images of the BNP that criticize the elite. Most such memes make fun of Diane 
Abbott, Member of Parliament for Labour, who is often mocked for allegedly being stu-
pid. Her inability to do mathematics is a returning topic for scorn. Similarly, Jeremy Cor-
byn was often portrayed in a mocking way. One image showed Jeremy Corbyn in be-
tween military men, wearing an “I love the IRA” t-shirt. The picture referred to Corbyn’s 
past in which he arguably spoke out in support of the paramilitary organization. Images 
making fun of these politicians portray them in very unflattering ways. Jeremy Corbyn 
often is pictured as dressed very shabbily (Figure 2), and Diane Abbott is shown pulling 
weird faces. Satirical imagery differs from other forms of manipulative content in that it 
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primarily focusses on mocking the alleged shortcomings of politicians. The images fit the 
populist ideology of the BNP. 
 
Figure 1 – Example of a factual visual 
 
The third category of images, those with a fallacious frame, apply various manipula-
tive techniques to propagandize information. Often these different types of manipula-
tive tactics were used in combination and were therefore not specified. The following 
paragraphs provide examples of the ways in which images were fallacious.  
 Images can be fallacious by offering too little information, and therefore 
making the image suggestive. Only one example occurred in the sample of images 
that was analysed for this study. The image portrays a woman, wearing a head-
scarf and having a phone in her hand. She walks past the victim of a terrorist 
attack in London. A few other people, who are not wearing a headscarf seem to 
help the victim. The image was posted on the page with the caption “London ter-
ror attack: A picture says a thousand words”. Without providing any further con-
textual information, it suggests that the veiled woman does not care about vic-
tims of the attacks, whereas all other people in the images are surrounding the 
victim. This image ‘became an Islamophobic meme’ online (Hunt and Pegg 2017). 
The image that was posted on the page of the BNP seems to be blurred, which 
underlines the suggestion that the woman walks past in a disinterested way. A 
sharp version of the image (see Hunt and Pegg 2017), clearly shows the distress 
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on the woman’s face. Suggestive pictures such as these leave it to the interpreter 
of the image to decide which message they take from it. 
 
Figure 2 – Example of a funny visual. The caption states: “Have you seen this man? Recently escaped from a secure 
mental institution, he suffers from delusions of grandeur and was last seen at Highgate Cemetery visiting the grave of 
Karl Marx. He responds to the name Jeremy”  
 
  
Slightly more common on the page were images that were fallacious because they 
were posted in the wrong context. These primarily consisted of screenshots of newspa-
per articles that were posted as if these were current items. One such example was a 
news article from 2008 that described how the police apologized for an add they put out 
with a puppy in it, because it “upsets Muslims”. Similarly, statements made by Sadiq 
Kahn, major of London, were often decontextualized as to portray his inability in leading 
the city. 
Fallacious images most often used a combination of exaggerated, sensationalized or 
partisan frames. Exaggerated post suggest that a specific event, situation or opinion is 
more widespread than it actually is. Many images on the page of the BNP use exaggera-
tions. The BNP often refers to a child sex abuse scandal, where several men were con-
victed for grooming young girls for sex. Posts on the page of the BNP suggests that these 
sex scandals are occurring in “all towns in the UK with a reasonable Muslim population”. 
Similarly, images showing pictures of Muslims advocating for Sharia law in London were 
captioned stating that this phenomenon was happening “right now in our towns and 
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cities”. Rarer were exaggerations that were used to criticize political opponents. In one 
example, the failure of Ukip is shown, as it is argued that with Henry Bolton leaving, the 
party would be “looking for their seventh leader in seventeen months”, which was an 
overstatement.  
Exaggerations often go together with sensationalist content, which relies on emo-
tional descriptions and scandalized reporting (Humprecht 2018, 12). The abovemen-
tioned child sex abuse scandal is sensationalized by using emotional phrasing. One image 
describes it as “acts of war” or the “worst ever slavery of whites”. The image portrayed 
in Figure 3 was shared multiple times on the page of the BNP, showing that it was con-
sidered by the page moderator(s) as effective in getting the attention of users. The image 
shows a crying girl and makes use of black and red letters. The text in the image makes 
sure to link the crime to Muslims, and to portray them as an outgroup by describing in 
capital letters that “our” children are “not halal meat” and that the men on trial are 
“Asian Muslims” accused of “gang rape of white girls”. This combination of colours is 
also visible in images that portray outrage about ritual slaughter. These images show 
bloodied sheep and are captioned in red letters with a horror font. Sensationalized posts 
attempt to heighten the emotional aspect of the message by portraying Muslims as ter-
rifying, violent or monstrous. Muslims are often presented with a burqa to emphasize 
their alleged faceless nature and heighten the fear towards them. The helplessness in 
countering this “Muslim takeover” is often stressed by portraying Theresa May’s incapa-
bility in handling the situation. She is often presented as very emotional, distraught and 
about to cry (Figure 4). 
Images can be fallacious or misleading by framing information in a partisan manner. 
In this case current news or happenings are described from a political perspective. Ex-
amples are linking low unemployment, problems with healthcare or homelessness to 
immigrants (Figure 5). Most partisan frames are combined with sensationalized or exag-
gerated reporting. An example is shown in Figure 6. The way in which the image is por-
trayed creates an effect of compassion. The elderly woman in the picture is even given 
a name as to make the message more personalized. This is strengthened by her looking 
into the camera and being portrayed in a colour compared to the background of the 
image. The background shows a large amount of people (“immigrants”), who are less 
visible, almost faceless and in black and white. This inequality between the woman who 
gets nothing, compared to the migrants who get everything (despite being, as the image 
suggests, with many more), can create the feeling of being considered and treated as 
“second class citizens”. This is a phrase that is used in several of the images of the BNP. 
The examples given in the text correctly underline the strong nativist nature of many of 
these fallacious images. 
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Figure 3 – Example of a fallacious visual 
  
Figure 4 – Example of an image with an emotionalized Teresa May  
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Figure 5 – Example of a fallacious image with a partisan frame 
 
Figure 6 – Example of a fallacious image with a partisan frame 
 
 
 
Fabricated content was less common. The only completely false content on the page 
were conspiracy theories related to planned or organized replacements. Fears were ex-
pressed that immigrants would replace “white people”, that non-white males would 
dominate white males, or that Islam would dominate Britain. Examples of such posts 
claimed that the “left-wing wants white people to have fewer children so that immigrants 
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can replace us”; or “advertisers deliberately do not show any white male in dominant 
roles”. Just as exaggerated posts, images containing conspiracies use visuals that evoke 
strong emotions. Conspiracy theories on Islamic takeover for example represented Te-
resa May with a photoshopped headscarf, and the burning of the British flag in the back-
ground (Figure 7). 
 
Figure 7 – Example of a fabricated image, with the caption “A high Court judge has set the precedent that Britain now 
has two laws of the land and that Shariah (Islamic Law) is to be recognised in British Law.” 
 
 
As posts presenting complete fake information were rarely occurring, the responses 
to these images were analysed qualitatively. Anger and disbelief were the main re-
sponses of users on most of the posts. However, the post on advertisers not willing to 
show white males evoked a lot of humorous reactions; and so, did a post stating that the 
Tories had a secret plan to sell out Britain to Muslims. Despite the overly serious tone in 
which these posts were brought – the latter post even contained an article fabricated by 
the BNP to support this story -, the responses suggest that many users perceived the 
story as too far-fetched to take it seriously.  
Table 3 portrays how the three main categories of information representation in im-
ages - factual, funny and fallacious – relate to how users engage with the content. The 
outcomes of Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) indicate that funny images evoked signifi-
cantly happier responses than images containing either factual or fallacious information 
(f=12.1;p<0.001). Similarly, images containing factual information evoked more 
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enthusiasm (f=5.58;p<0.05) than imagery that was fallacious or funny. Images that were 
fallacious or misleading created many angrier (18.24; p<0.001), surprised (11.07; 
p<0.001) and sad responses (4.11; p<0.05) as well as many more comments from follow-
ers (7.75; p<0.01) than factual or funny imagery.  
 
Table 3 – Comparison of mean values of followers’ activity for different types of information in images 
 Factual Fallacious Funny F p 
Number of images 127 179 30   
👍 – like  230.8(337.04) 265.7 (338.03) 226.4 (141.91) 0.50  
😠 – anger  16.35 (44.13) 87.61 (142.47) 8.367 (17.05) 18.24 ***< .001 
😞 – sadness  1.606 (6.24) 6.631 (22.58) 1.667 (3.84)  4.11 * <.05 
😲 – surprise/disbelief 1.488 (3.08) 4.274 (7.27) 1.467 (1.36) 11.07 ***< .001 
😂 – hilarious 12.85 (50.90) 16.75 (34.88) 115.6 (150.92) 12.1 ***< .001 
❤️ – love  10.02 (17.99) 6.302 (14.17) 4.267 (4.72) 5.85 * <.05 
💬 – comment 49.9 (92.43) 119.9 (230.23) 60.10 (62.62) 7.75 ** <.01 
Source: Authors elaboration  
 
6. Discussion and conclusion 
   
This paper analysed how information is presented in images created and distributed 
on Facebook by the British National Party and how users engage differently with these 
forms of visual manipulation. The findings show that images do not usually consist of 
outright lies or hoaxes. However, most images do present information in a manipulated 
or fallacious manner. Most posts on the page presented information that was factual, 
but framed, by selectively using quotes or statistics (Wardle and Derakhshan 2018, 54). 
This finding suggests that scholars should more carefully distinguish between different 
degrees of manipulation in content, as to better understand the phenomenon, rather 
than merging categories of partisan, misleading and completely fabricated content (cf. 
Humprecht 2018). The low number of completely fabricated images on the page further-
more puts a critical note to the assumed relevance of the phenomenon of fake news (cf. 
Guess, Nyhan and Reifler 2018; Allcott and Gentzkow 2017).   
The outcomes of this study are in line with the findings of Humprecht (2018), who 
found a high amount of partisan news stories in the UK and a relatively low number of 
stories emerging out of rumours. On the page of the BNP “emotionalized, scandalized 
and conflict-oriented” content dominated as well. This lack of complete fake news items 
and the absence of a fake new industry in Britain has previously been linked to the pres-
ence and role of highly partisan newspapers in the British context (Waterson 2017b). 
Nevertheless, complete fabrications might not be as effective in influencing people’s 
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views than stories that have some aspect of truth in them (Sunstein, 2014). In this sense, 
the finding that almost half of the images are manipulative, is worrying. 
In line with Vosoughi et al. (2018), I found that different ways of portraying infor-
mation seemed to evoke different interactions and emotional responses from users. 
Funny images led to significantly happier responses than visuals containing either factual 
or misleading information. Similarly, users were more enthusiastic about images con-
taining factual information than about visuals with fallacious or funny content. Images 
that were fallacious aroused more angry, surprised and sad responses than factual or 
funny content. Moreover, fallacious images also evoked many more user activity in the 
form of comments than images that were factual or funny. These findings suggest that 
false or misleading information seems to induce participation in online political talk.  
Images can powerfully shape how viewers think about certain political issues and can 
evoke strong emotions. Emotions, that were evoked by manipulated and fake, such as 
anger, sadness and disbelief have been shown to affect political beliefs and political be-
haviour. This is the case for both offline and online political behaviour. Vosoughi, Roy 
and Aral (2018) found that online content that evokes anger and disbelief increases peo-
ple’s online involvement in politics and is shared more often than content that leads to 
happiness or joy. In turn, an increased online involvement can also reinforce offline mo-
bilisation (Vissers and Stolle 2014).  
The persuasive potential of images is often overlooked, but important now that 
younger generations are shifting to visual-based platforms (Anderson and Jiang 2018). 
These platforms are used for spreading so-called computational propaganda (Woolley 
and Howard 2017). The fear of the misleading abilities of visuals is not limited to images. 
With the emergence of a phenomenon called deep-fakes not only images can be mim-
icked, but also video material (Chesney and Citron 2019). The easy access to tools to 
manipulate reality convincingly, is thus, an alarming development in the field of political 
communication.  
This study offers a methodological framework for further research. Images might be-
come an interesting new venue for online research, compared to the strong big-data and 
textual focus in online research. These forms of data contain a “richness that scholars 
will not see if we continue an overreliance on tagged data sets” as well as other forms 
of big data analyses (Gerrard 2018, 9). With the increasing multimodal nature of our 
interactions, this visual aspect should not be overlooked (Matamoros-Fernández 2018).  
Visuals play an increasingly important role in the online strategies of parties and 
movements. Penney (2017) for example shows how the Bernie Sanders campaign during 
the 2016 US Presidential election made strategic use of bottom-up online groups to 
heighten the popularity of Sanders using memes. Moreover, Baldwin-Philippi (2019) 
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shows how memes were used strategically by the Trump campaign to amplify a populist 
message. She argues how the unprofessional look of many of these memes suggested 
that anyone could participate in creating political content using a meme generator. 
The visuals of the British National Party seem to fit a clear online strategy. Different 
aspects of their far-right ideology were represented using various tactics. Funny images 
often mocked politicians’ inabilities, fallacious images tended to use exaggerations to 
describe the subordinated positions of the “white British”, and to exaggerate the danger 
or presence of foreigners in the country. Fabrications were exclusively conspiracy theo-
ries that feared that “the system”, whether it be leftist politicians, the mainstream media 
or advertisers, had a purposeful plan to install Sharia law in Britain, or “ethnically 
cleanse” the British population for the sake of diversity. Factual posts primarily address 
information about the party, or express pride for the army, the national soccer team, 
national heroes or for Britain itself. The way images look suggests a strategy as well. 
Images referring to the ingroup or the nation often contained lighter colours and positive 
symbols (the flag, the poppy), images that referred to the outgroup relied on strong 
emotional colours and language, which was often underlined, capitalized or in bold let-
ters. Images about the party itself on the other hand, had a much more professional 
outlook. 
While memes are employed by political actors on the left- and right side of the politi-
cal spectrum (Waterson 2017a; Penney 2017), they are especially a useful medium to 
diffuse populist political propaganda. Their briefness and visual aspects fit well with the 
simplified, sharp and emotional nature of far-right discourse (Bartlett 2014). Future stud-
ies should address the varieties in use of visuals between populist actors as well as the 
use of cultural, visual and symbolic elements that make this modern-day form of propa-
ganda so effective.  
Despite the limited electoral success of the BNP, the online influence of the party goes 
beyond electoral mobilization. Online pages with a large reach, such as BNP, play a key 
role in the mainstreaming of far-right discourses. This is shown by Berntzen and 
Weisskircher (2016, 570) who argue that, despite PEGIDA no longer being “a label for 
street mobilization", the Facebook pages of this movement provide “permanent arenas 
for disseminating their views”. This is important as through the ability “to circumvent 
traditional channels of communication and control”, these groups can spread their mes-
sages and frames transnationally. Far-right actors draw inspiration from each other by 
taking over symbols, songs and political discourses (Wodak, 2013). Images are of im-
portance for this, as these are understandable for broader audiences, even transnation-
ally (Doerr, 2017). Doerr (2017) shows how an anti-immigrant cartoon aided the Swiss 
People’s Party (SVP) in gaining broader support and reaching the mainstream. The same 
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poster was adopted, like a meme, by far-right parties in different European countries. 
Online, such transnational adaptations of a meme might occur more swiftly and virally, 
reaching mainstream audiences. 
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